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SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN SAUDI ARABIA
PART 11

THE HONORABLE HERMANN FR. EILTS
FORMER AMBASSADOR TO SAUDI ARABIA, 1965-1970

Part I of this review of social change in
Saudi Arabia, published in the Spring issue o f
Parameters, provided perspective on the
impact of the modernization process on a still
largely traditional Saudi society. The
discovery and exploitation of the country's
enormous petroleum reserves, a growing
governmental income enabling considerable
economic development, the exposure of Saudi
nationals to a large number o f expatriates, a
massive and costly national defense program
and a variety of related developments have all
had an effect on molding, sometimes
imperceptibly, new Saudi social attitudes. Since
the publication of Part I, the Saudi Arabian
Government has announced the initiation o f a
comprehensive m u l t i - y e a r e c o n o m i c
d e v e l o p m e n t program, calling for
governmental and private capital investment
of approximately $9.1 billion to stimulate
growth in virtually every sector o f Saudi
society and economy. This newly approved
economic development plan is designed to
increase the Kingdom's manpower resources,
Ambassador Eilts, Diplomatic Adviser to the Army
War College Commandant, earned his BA (History and
Political Science) at Ursinus College and his MA
(International Relations and Middle East Studies) at
Johns Hopkins University in the School of Advanced
International Studies. He has received the Arthur F.
Flemming Award for Distinguished Government
Service and is a graduate of the National War College.
In World War II he served in
North Africa and Europe as an
Army intelligence officer.
Foreign Service assignments
with the Department of State
have taken him to Iran, Aden,
Yemen, Iraq, Great Britain,
Libya, and twice to Saudi
Arabia. In 1970, he came to
Carlisle Barracks from Saudi
Arabia where he had served as
US Ambassador since 1965.

to diversify the sources of national revenue by
reducing the country's present heavy
dependence on petroleum, and to increate
substantially agricultural production. A new
Civil Service Code, which had been under
discussion for well over a year, was adopted in
April 1971, and is designed to standardize
duties, rank structure and employee practices
for t h e S a u d i Arabian governmental
bureaucracy. Still another potentially
significant harbinger o f political and social
change is the recent establishment by royal
decree o f a Ministry o f Justice, headed by
Qadhi Muhammed ibn Ali Al-Harakan, a
highly respected and forward-looking former
magistrate o f Jidda. Included in the promised
ten point reform program of 1962 and long
under discussion, such a Ministry may
facilitate the complex task o f reconciling
traditional shari'a concepts with the legal
requirements o f a modernizing society. The
naming o f a minister from outside the
Al-Shaykh sept, some speculate, may augur an
easing o f the strong grip which that
distinguished family has had on the country's
judicial system since the inception o f the
Saudi state two centuries ago.
Part II, below, addresses educational
developments, communications, the role o f
women, and the tribal society in this land o f
transition. I t c o n c l u d e s with some
observations by the author regarding what we
might expect as Saudi Arabia confronts the
decade o f the 70's.
EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Among the more dramatic aspects of Saudi
Arabian social development in the past two
decades has been the phenomenal rise of
education. The primary kuttab schools,
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President Nixon and King Faysal on the White House lawn during the latter's official visit to
Washington, D.C., May 27, 1971.

Although curriculum content in the lower
grades is still largely shaped by Islamic and
Arabic cultural values, its scope is broadened
a s t h e student progresses to include
mathematics, sciences, and foreign languages.
English is the principal foreign language
taught.
This rapid expansion of schools exceeded
indigenous Saudi staffing capabilities and
required the Saudi Arabian Government to
engage teachers from Jordan, Syria, and
elsewhere. Teachers of Saudi nationality
outnumber non-Saudis in the elementary
schools, but the reverse is the case at both
intermediate and secondary levels. In order
to redress this situation, Teachers' Training
Institutes have been established for all school
levels. Seven such institutes, geographically
spread throughout the Western, Central and
Eastern Provinces, currently exist. Vocational
training has also received its due. There are at
present five industrial (vocational) schools

designed to teach all youngsters to recite the
Quran and to acquaint them with the
essentials of Islam, had long existed. Lacking
was an all-embracing modern educational
structure. This had to be established virtually
from scratch. Through the efforts of Prince
Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, the Second Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior who
formerly served as Minister of Education, and
of Shaykh Abdullah ibn Hassan Al-Shaykh,
w h o n o w holds the latter portfolio,
educational advance has made enormous
strides. Between 1957 and 1968 the total
annual appropriation of the Saudi Arabia
Government for education almost
quadrupled. I t rose from about $33 million to
over $116 million. As might be expected in a
male-oriented society, education for boys has
received principal emphasis. At all levels, the
number of boys' schools, their student
population, and their teacher staffing have
soared.
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located in Jidda, Riyadh (two), Medina, and
Hofuf. Training for the handicapped is
undertaken in various Institutes for the Blind
scattered about the country, and at an
Institute for the Deaf and Dumb in Riyadh.
More controversial in a traditional Saudi
society, but also progressing, has been
education for girls. Outside the purview of the
Ministry of Education, it is conducted under a
General Administration for Girls' Schools,
headed by a highly conservative religious
figure who reports directly to the monarch.
There were, and still are, many Saudis who
question the need for formal education of the
fair sex. Some years ago, for example, in the
puritanical town of Burayda in Qasim
Province, where an intermediate school for
girls was about to be established by the
government, to be shared with the nearby
town of Anayza, the Buraydans threatened
forcibly to prevent the school from opening.
They were deterred only by the deployment
of troops. They were firmly told by the
monarch that they were free to send their
daughters or not, but that the school would
be opened for those who wished to take
advantage of its services. Not long afterwards,
many suggest because of the pressure of the
women of Burayda on their menfolk, Burayda
followed Anayza and somewhat abashedly
availed itself of the opportunity.
Saudi Arabian Government appropriations
for girls' schools rose from about $440
thousand in 1960 to over $13 million in
1967. Government-sponsored elementary
schools for girls were begun in 1960;
intermediate and secondary schools of this
category f o l l o w e d f o u r years later.
Intermediate schools for girls are now located
in Riyadh, Jidda, Mecca, Tayf, Medina, and
the Eastern Province. Only the Central
Region, i.e., Riyadh, has two secondary
schools for girls. As yet coeducation is not
accepted anywhere in the country.
A large number of girls have regularly
attended private girls' schools, especially at
t h e kindergarten, elementary, and
intermediate levels. Even in private girls'
schools, however, secondary education could
n o t b e introduced until 1964, when
government schools accepted this innovation.

In 1968 there were almost 9,000 girls
registered in all levels of private girls' schools.
Three secular institutions of higher learning
currently exist in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh
University, established in 1957 with only 64
students, has increased its enrollment to
about 1,900 students. It now includes
faculties of liberal arts, science, commerce,
agriculture, engineering (originally UNESCO
sponsored) and pharmacy. A medical school
will shortly be added. Four years ago the King
Ahd al-Aziz University was founded in Jidda
as a private institution, the first of its kind in
Saudi Arabia. The flow of private donations
proved inadequate to meet the growing
e x p e n s e s o f c u r r i c u l u m a n d plant
development and required the school t o seek
a n d accept some government financial
assistance. In April 1971, persistent financial
deficits caused the King Abd al-Aziz
University to be taken over by the Saudi
Arabian Government as a part of the national
higher educational system. With a current
enrollment of about 200 students, the King
Abd al-Aziz University hopes to graduate its
first class in 1972. A College of Petroleum
and Minerals, conducted under the aegis of
the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources rather than the Ministry of
Education, exists in Dhahran with an
enrollment of about 200 students. 10
Education is free at all of these schools and
students who attend them receive monthly
government stipends. Student study habits
could be strengthened across the board, but
degree work at the Saudi universities ranges
from satisfactory to good.
At Riyadh University women have been
permitted to take courses as nonresidents
since 1962 in the faculties of arts and
commerce. Some 123 women were enrolled in
liberal arts in 1968 and another 14 in
commerce. At the King Abd al-Aziz
University a women's faculty of liberal arts
was established, but was physically located in
premises removed from the school's principal
campus. It was a source of considerable pride
to the distaff sector of that university when a
woman placed first in the Saudi Arabian
Government-sponsored examinations held for
all college students in 1969. Following the

recent governmental take-over of the King
Abd al-Aziz University, its school for women
was detached and will henceforth be
separately administered by the General
Administration for Girls' Schools.
Until the relatively recent establishment
and development of higher education in Saudi
Arabia, large numbers of Saudi secondary
school graduates were sent to universities in
America, Europe, and to other Arab states for
degree work. Some went on their parents'
a c c o u n t ; o t h e r s , as S a u d i Arabian
G o v e r n m e n t bursary students. Precise
statistics on the total number are not
available, but estimates of graduates of such
outside universities range from 2,000 t o
4,000. Approximately 1,000 Saudi students
are currently studying in American colleges
and universities. Most concentrate on the
social sciences and, on their return, are
absorbed into government ministries as civil
servants or teachers, or go into business.

Usually fired with considerable enthusiasm at
the time they return, many soon revert to the
more leisurely patterns of Saudi society.
Others are clearly restive and would like faster
change. I n 1969 the Saudi Arabian
Government determined henceforth to send
only graduate students abroad and to require
new undergraduates to d o their work in Saudi
universities.
As might be expected in a country with so
deep an Islamic tradition, religious education
has also been given priority billing. A series of
religious institutes of intermediate and
secondary level, directed by the religious
authorities, have been established in various
parts of the country. Atop these is a Ministry
of Education-conducted Shari'a College of
Law and Islamic Studies, with dual premises
in Riyadh and Mecca. Student enrollment in
the intermediate and secondary religious
institutes totaled almost 8,000 in 1968. At
the higher level of religious education, the
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Secretary of State Rogers escorting King Faysal at the Department of State, May 28, 1971.

number is sharply reduced. In that same year
almost 550 students attended the Shari'a
College. These figures offer some clue to the
continuing attraction of religious education.
The higher level students train t o be the
ulema of the future. Many have traveled
abroad. All have matured in a different
economic and social environment than the
one experienced by the generation of their
immediate predecessors. They will perhaps
bring to their religious duties a broader
o u t l o o k o n t h e changing spiritual
requirements of a modernizing people.
Saudi Arabia has also experimented with
adult education. By 1968 it claimed 550
schools intended for this purpose with an
enrollment of 34,824 participants. Such
schools are located primarily in the Eastern
Province, Jidda, Jizan, Riyadh, Jauf, Tayf,
Medina, Mecca, Qunfidha and Qasim.
The direct interest taken by King Faysal
and his family in the development of
education has been a major encouragement.
The King has personally sponsored the Thagr
Model School for Boys; his spouse, Amira
Iffat, has done likewise for the Dar Al-Hanan
School for Girls. Both are located in Jidda
and range from kindergarten t o secondary
levels. Although considered as private rather
than governmental schools, they have set a
standard which other institutions seek to
follow. Equally noteworthy and in striking
contrast to the disinterest of the late King
Saud in educating his children, all but the
eldest of King Faysal's sons have graduated
from either American or British universities or
their equivalent. They have done so on their
father's strong encouragement. Without fuss
or fanfare, each of the King's sons is currently
serving the country in a responsible and
productive pursuit. Most of the daughters of
King Faysal have been educated in private
schools abroad and, judging from accounts of
those who know them, are extremely
intelligent young ladies.
T h e process of educational advance
continues. With the increase in numbers,
quality is now being stressed. Confronted
with an unusually high illiteracy rate, which
was estimated in 1960 to be about 85
percent, the Saudi Arabian Government has

concentrated on trying to raise the literacy
factor.11 Although current literacy statistics
are lacking, it is undoubtedly making progress
in this sphere. In a broader sense, the Saudi
authorities have sought to train more persons
t o assume t h e increasingly complex
responsibilities of government and business.
In time, the government hopes to reach
self-sufficiency in indigenous teachers, who
may be expected to have a more enduring
interest in furthering the nation's welfare than
can be expected of short-term expatriates.

COMMUNICATIONS

In Saudi Arabia, as elsewhere, the advent of
modern communications has acted as a
powerful stimulus to social change. The
introduction of such communications has not
been without dispute. Philby, for example,
has recounted the initial objection of the
ulema to the telephone as unsanctioned by
Allah and the maneuver employed by the late
King Abd al-Aziz to have the Quran read over
that instrument in order to persuade the
religious doctors that the device could hardly
be sinful.12
Radio was introduced into the country in
the thirties with similar misgivings, but
quickly proved its utility. During World War
II King Abd al-Aziz and his court had to rely
mainly on radio to keep abreast of the
evolving military situation. For a long time
BBC was exclusively listened t o as a purveyor
of information. Over the years, however, the
volume of foreign radio programs beamed to
the Arab world by the United States, the
Soviet Union, and others has increased
steadily. In recent years, in Saudi Arabia as
elsewhere in the Arab world, Radio Kol Israel
has been listened to widely as a source of
news. During the Saudi-UAR confrontation,
prompted by the Yemeni Civil War and lasting
from 1962-1967, the Egyptian station Sawt
al-Arab was particularly virulent in its attacks
on the Saudi regime. Other radical Arab state
radios have likewise attacked Saudi Arabia for
its internal and external policies.
There is no way of preventing Saudis from

hearing

such b r o a d c a s t s . Essentially
in its outlook, respecting the
person of King Faysal and distrusting the
intentions of some of its Arab neighbors, the
Saudi public at large has thus far shown little
reaction to such radio attacks. These
broadcasts have doubtless affected some of
the young people, however, who privately
deplore what they regard as Saudi Arabia's
isolation from the main currents of Arab
political thinking. Undoubtedly, too, these
hostile broadcasts have created a greater
undercurrent of anti-American attitudes on
the part of many Saudis than is evident on the
surface.
Saudi Arabia has established its own radio
stations in Jidda and Riyadh. Program
content is diverse and ranges from news to
music to religious sermons. In recent years
some programs for women have been
introduced.
Of far greater impact than radio has been
television. In October 1962, a royal order was
issued calling for the establishment of
television. In the following year, an agreement
was signed with the Government of the
United States whereby the services of the
United States Army Corps of Engineers were
made available to plan and supervise the
construction of such stations. The US Army
Engineers subsequently contracted with
NBC/I—and, since the beginning of 1969, with
AVCO—to operate the stations. Under the
guidance of a foresighted former Saudi
Minister of Information, Shaykh Jamil
Hujaylan, work proceeded apace. In July
1965, the first two stations were completed in
Jidda and Riyadh. Two years later, through
microwave links, Mecca and Tayf were
connected with the Jidda station. In
December 1967 and July 1968, slightly
smaller television stations were completed in
Medina and Burayda, respectively.
Despite monetary concern prior to station
completion that the conservative folk of
Burayda might balk and seek to damage the
tower, there was no such hostile reaction.
Residents of the Eastern Province had since
September 1957 enjoyed access to an
ARAMCO-operated station. In May 1969, the
Saudi Ministry of Information completed two

powerful transmitters in Damma
have taken over all television trans
the Eastern Province and can r
areas in the Gulf as well.
Exact figures are lacking, but an estimated
5 2 , 0 0 0 - 6 7 , 0 0 0 television receivers are
believed to have been imported to Saudi
Arabia. Many are located in coffee houses
where multiple viewing is the rule. Assuming
that approximately 10 persons watch each
receiver, an estimated 520,000 t o 670,000
Saudis— or about 20 percent of the
population-are now looking at television. The
number is increasing.
Programing is a n exclusive Saudi
responsibility. Initially, conservative skeptics
of the desirability of introducing television
were won over by stressing its value as a
means of spreading religious doctrine. In
consequence, the first programs had t o give
heavy emphasis to scripture readings, religious
lectures, and classical Arabic music. By the
spring of 1967, the ratio of religious programs
had fallen t o approximately 10 percent.
Canned American programs, having higher
entertainment content and complete with
Arabic subtitles, increased. Following
complaints by the ulema to the monarch, a
Committee on Information was established in
November 1967, by royal order, to insure
that television programing conformed with
Saudi custom and to curtail the number of
programs with English sound tracks and the
number of films showing violence, crime, or
women. This led again to an increase in the
number of religious programs which by early
1968 were once more consuming about a
quarter of all the air time available. The
Burayda station as late as 1968 devoted over
50 percent of its time t o religious programs.
Much to the distress of the ulema, a few
Saudi women have occasionally appeared on
television. Although ulema indignation has
usually forced this practice t o be dropped, the
trend will probably be revived.
Programing has recently been expanded in
Jidda to 35 hours a week, of which more than
16 depend on foreign films. Visnews, a British
firm, provides news tapes. American programs
such as Bonanza, Combat, Private
S e c r e t a r y , Dennis t h e Menace, the

Flintstones, and even the Honeymooners are
frequent fare. The most popular programs are
Combat, Perry Mason, the Saint, and an
i n t e r m i n a b l e Lebanese film, Ghawar
Adventure, along with foreign wrestling
programs. Live quiz shows, usually with much
animated audience participation, are greatly
appreciated.
It is obviously difficult to measure with
anv accuracv the possible effects of television.
believe that the screen exposure to
nonSaudi culture may eventually prove more
profound than the effects of foreign
economic penetration. Saudis can drive
Chevrolets, fly in Boeings, or eat American
rice without changing their basic ideas about
social customs, mores, and morals. The
impact of ideas projected on the television
screen may be more enduring. The five
stations throughout the country regularly
exchange programs. This feature of television
may also increase national identity among
middle class Saudis.
Although by now firmly established,
television continues to stir controversy among
the more orthodox. Those managing the
system must therefore steer a cautious course.
In their programing they must propitiate the
conservatives by appropriate religious
content, yet at the same time recognize that a
growing majority of Saudis look to the
medium for entertainment. Some suggest that
television is outflanking the ulema. If this is
true, it is partly because of a failure on the
part of too many of the religious doctors to
recognize its utility for their purposes. At
least one distinguished alim, Shaykh Ali
Tantawi, is demonstrating the value of
television in the cause of religion. Possessed of
an engaging television personality, this savant
conducts a regular question and answer
program on religious subjects. He invites
written questions, reads them before the
television camera, and with homely anecdote
about and relevant allusion to contemporary
everyday life instructs his viewers. Lacking his
imagination, s o m e of his colleagues
shortsightedly criticize him. He deserves more
credit. By introducing an element of zest into
religious teaching, he increases its appeal to a
Saudi generation that is bound to be affected
by the materialism of our times.

The public showing of motion pictures
remains forbidden. Nevertheless, a lucrative
business has grown up in renting films for
private showings. Although occasionally
stopped by the religious police, the enterprise
seems always to bounce back and appears to
prosper.

ROLE OF WOMEN

Any assessment of change in Saudi Arabia
requires at least a brief consideration of the
status of women and of the bedouin; not
because of any direct affinity between them,
but because they share a common elusiveness
for the outside observer.
S a u d i Arabia remains s t a u n c h l y
segregationist. Apart from the immediate
family, the sexes are not expected to mix.
The role of the Saudi woman has traditionally
been that of inferior, the servant of man, and
closely circumscribed. Although possessed of
rights under the shari'a, her legal status is not
equal to that of the male members of society.
Marriage is usually arranged for her, divorce
made easy for the husband, and polygamy is
permitted. The veil and ankle-length dress still
shroud her from the public view. The image
has its validity, but is overdrawn.
The role of women is doubtless second to
men. The veil persists, although interested
observers note that it is becoming more
transparent. Nor does it prevent acute
feminine observation and the subsequent joys
of indiscriminate gossip. Now, as before,
moreover, the role of mother or wife is a
powerful one. Mother and wife exercise
considerable influence in family councils.
Polygamy, although legally permissible, is
becoming increasingly rare. In our times, even
with the rise in income, few Saudis can afford
more than one wife.
To be sure, the family remains the arbiter
of woman's destiny and is in turn deeply
influenced in its management of women's
affairs by the dictates of traditional Islam. At
school the girl learns religion and the Arabic
sciences. The already mentioned increase in
education for girls has begun to offer
opportunities for higher learning, of which an

ARAMCO

The Hajj (Pilgrimage), one of the five pillars of Islam; Pilgrims at the Holy Ka'aba in Mecca.

increasing number of Saudi girls avail
themselves. Yet among most Saudi families,
female education tends to be regarded as an
end in itself rather than a means to an end.
An educated girl is a more interesting wife
and mother, hence she is more marriageable.
Apart from teaching and some social work
involving women, female employment
o p p o r t u n i t i e s remain rare. Gradually,
however, a few openings are developing. For
specific duties, largely involving contact with
other women, various Saudi ministries have
number of women. Some
engaged a
years ago the police at Qaysumah, located
along the TAPLINE route, startled the
national authorities by requesting permission
to hire a woman warder for female prisoners.
Where women are engaged, they work in strict
isolation. Such occupations as nursing and
secretarial work, which require association of
the sexes outside the family, remain frowned

underpopulated country. Yet, birth control,
largely voluntary on the part of younger wives
and mothers, is quietly spreading. The "pill"
has become a major pharmaceutical import.
Already a type of social ambivalence
characterizes many of the younger Saudi
women. At one and the same time they seek
to adopt Western fashions, yet conceal them
under the garb of prescribed tradition. It is at
times interesting t o observe a Saudi woman
boarding an aircraft somewhere in Europe,
dressed in the latest style, yet casually
donning veil and the amorphous black abaya
shortly before arrival at Jidda or some other
Saudi debarkation point.

remains centered in homemaking and
childbearing. Recreation largely takes the
form of visiting other women. Weddings and
the Saudi equivalent of baptisms remain the
two most important social functions. Yet
among women, too, education, radio and
above all television are beginning t o show
their impact.
Behind the veil and under the ankle-length
outside cloak, the abaya, are worn glamorous
miniskirts, gowns, and other modern fashions.
They may be imported, but they are worn
with confident verve. Wealth has enabled the
Saudi woman to cultivate style in dress,

has been estimated that approximately 20
percent of the total Saudi population of
perhaps four million are tribally oriented,
pastoral nomads.13 The great tribes of
Anayza, Shammar, Mutayr, Atayba, Harb,
Al-Murrah, Manasir, to mention but a few,
remain much in evidence in the Saudi
countryside. Their one time security threat
has been largely removed, but they remain a
truculent element of society. Like the ulema,
their leaders are received in royal audience
every Thursday, while individual tribesmen
appear at the King's daily majliss loudly to
demand this or that governmental service.

signs of slowly being breached. A small
number of modernized Saudi women are
willing to join their husbands in mixed
company with Westerners or with other Saudi
couples. A still smaller number of Saudi
husbands are willing to have them do so. In
the years ahead more women will probably
persuade their husbands to risk the social
opprobrium which such mixed visitations still
entail. Family planning is not religiously
approved and hardly seems necessary in an

Bedouin settlement schemes are often
discussed. An effort has for some years been
u n d e r w a y , t h r o u g h t h e Ministry of
Agriculture, t o establish a bedouin
resettlement area at Haradh, southeast of
Riyadh. This involves converting about
10,000 acres of desert to irrigated land in
order to settle about 1,000 bedouin families.
Indicative of the sensitivity of such a scheme,
King Faysal has instructed that only
Al-Mussah tribesmen be settled there lest a

*

*

*

*

*

TRIBAL SOCIETY

The bedouin remain a significant economic
and social problem for Saudi Arabia.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jidda.

takes the labor out of tentmaking and takes
less time to erect or take down than does the
homespun variety.
The goatskin water bag is increasingly being
replaced by the rubber inner tubes of
discarded tires. One sees more and more
trucks parked near nomadic encampments.
Such conveyances permit the hauling of sheep
and goats to more distant pasturages.
Similarly, many such bedouin encampments
have tanker trucks bringing in needed water
rather than moving camps continuously in
search of it. The governor of the Eastern
Province, a man deeply experienced in
bedouin affairs, once attributed the trend to
the nagging pressure of the bedouin wife,
demanding that her husband emulate the
neighbors and acquire a vehicle of his own.
Whether this keeping-up-with-the-Joneses
explanation is valid or not, the acceptance of
modern motor transport by nomadic elements
has the dual effect of lengthening site tenure
and increasing grazing parameters.
Nor has the nomad been immune to

more heterogeneous group rekindle old tribal
feuds and add to the complexities of settling
these nomads. At last report, some difficulty
was being encountered in selecting Al-Murrah
families who might give promise of making
the scheme work.
The task of bedouin resettlement is
u n q u e s t i o n a b l y f o r m i d a b l e . I n this
connection, the lessons of the paramilitary
National Guard may be instructive. Made up
largely of bedouin elements and organized-at
least among its irregular formations-on
strictly tribal lines, small villages consisting of
the families of serving guardsmen have grown
u p a r o u n d most National Guard
encampments. These can hardly be considered
permanent. Yet, depending on the
deployment of the unit, many of these
settlements remain for years.
In other areas of activity, too, one senses
elements of change in bedouin life. Thus, for
alongside the traditional black
goathair tent nowadays there often stands a
modern, store-purchased wall tent. The latter
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communication innovations. Although he
may lack regular exposure to television, the
transistor radio has found its way into many
bedouin encampments and brings with it an
increased-if still a suspicious-awareness of
the world around him.
The bedouin continues to rely to some
extent on the products of his camel, sheep,
and goats for his everyday livelihood. With
modern roads and trucks, however, the camel
has lost its utility as a carrier of merchandise.
Instead, apart from family transport, it is
destined mainly for the butcher shops of
Saudi towns. Here, too, practices are
changing. A scene witnessed a few years ago
in the northern village of 'Ar'Ar (Badanah)
will illustrate the point. While driving near the
outskirts of the village, the writer noted
several tribesmen seemingly experiencing
difficulty with a group of protesting camels.
An attempt was underway to truss up all four
legs of each of the brutes. This seemed a
highly unusual way of hobbling, which
customarily takes the form of a rope between
the fetlocks of the front legs, and prompted
an inquiry as to what they were doing.
Tribesmen are reluctant to identify tribal
affiliation and these were no exception. After
some sparring, one finally acknowledged that
he was of the Atayba and explained that the
camels were to be sold to the butcher shops
of Riyadh, some 400 miles distant. He
pointed to a nearby Mercedes truck and
explained that twelve such fully trussed
camels could be loaded onto the vehicle.
Noting that such trucking was surely
expensive, the writer asked whether it would
not be cheaper to walk the animals to Riyadh.
The ragged Atayba tribesman scoffed at the
suggestion. Any such trip, he loudly
maintained, would take at least ten days,
would emaciate the camel, and would
certainly fatigue the herdsmen. The butchers
of Riyadh pay little for scrawny animals. The
truck rental might cost as much as 1,000
riyals, but it would insure the arrival of the
dozen camels within a day and in prime
condition. They might then be expected to
fetch at least 800 riyals each and with no
strain on the herdsman, who planned to ride
in the cab! Truly, the economy and the

practices of the bedouin are not devoid of
change.

Social ferment is inevitable, constant, and
not in itself wrong. It reflects a public
demand for social benefits commensurate
with technological progress. Neither official
decree n o r religious orthodoxy can
permanently still it. Its constructive potential
needs to be recognized and the test of
leadership is to channel it into the building of
a better society. Faith and change should not
pose as mutually antagonistic. They should
move in tandem for the common good. Like
devout Muslims everywhere, Saudis are
g r a p p l i n g w i t h t h e problems of
modernization. They may deplore the
political excesses and economic follies of
some of their neighbors, but they are also
keenly aware of developments in surrounding
Arab states.
Saudi Arabia has made much progress, but
much remains to be done. The national
dialogue on the nature of desired change, long
underway at the private level, has entered
the public domain. In a carefully worded
editorial, a leading Jidda newspaper editor
recently expressed public appreciation for
achievements to date, but declared that the
individual Saudi now looks forward to the
promulgation of a "basic law," to new
provincial regulations that may further the
process of decentralization, to more low
income housing, and to the development of
innocent recreation within the country. Such
reforms, he explained in good Islamic
dialectic, are needed to ". . .create a strong
Islam capable of fighting a11 destructive
elements and ideologies."14 These aspirations
are modest enough and are consistent with
the as yet only partially fulfilled 1962 reform
program.
The public dialogue remains muted, but it
will grow in volume. There is nothing static
about Saudi society. It is dynamic and, with
continued forward-looking leadership, it is
capable of constructive progress. In the
decade of the seventies Saudi leadership will
increasingly have to come to grips with the

admittedly difficult task of reconciling the
country's fundamental values with the
inexorable forces of social change. Success in
this endeavor is essential for continued
stability, development, and the welfare of the
nation as a whole.
(This concludes the two-part survey of the
b a c k g r o u n d a n d c u r r e n t conditions
contributing to the social change taking place
in Saudi Arabia.)
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